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THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF REGULATION
IN PROMOTING
EQUITY MARKET COMPETITION
Daniel M. Gray*
I. INTRODUCTION
November 2006 was a particularly good time for a symposium to
evaluate equity market structure. In the United States, the equity markets
were entering the final stages of implementation for Regulation NMS.
Adopted in June 2005, Regulation NMS embodies changes to market
structure that are designed to enhance and modernize the national market
system adopted under section 11A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the ‘34 Act).1 Regulation NMS includes a trade-through rule that generally
prevents a market from executing trades at prices inferior to automated
quotes that are displayed and immediately accessible at other markets.2
Over the last two years, the U.S. equity markets have been transformed.
There are ten registered securities exchanges in the U.S., and nine of the ten
have adopted new equity trading systems. Perhaps most notably, the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the largest equity market in the world, has
fully automated its quote for the first time in its history. The exchanges
brought their new trading systems into full operation on March 5, 2007.3
In Europe, as well, the state of competition among equity exchanges is
in flux. As the economic boundaries between European countries have
blurred, so have the boundaries between the traditional national stock
exchanges. Several smaller exchanges have already merged, and there has
been a continuing dance involving potential mergers among the “Big

* Senior Special Counsel for Market Structure, Division of Market Regulation, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of
policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission or of the author’s colleagues upon the staff of the Commission. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the
author’s colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
1. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 29, 2005)
(adopting release).
2. Regulation NMS Rule 611, 17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2006). Rule 611 replaces an older tradethrough rule that had applied to securities listed on exchanges other than Nasdaq. Rule 611
updates the old rule by extending trade-through protection only to automated quotes, in contrast to
the old rule that protected both automated and manual quotes. In addition, Rule 611 applies
to stocks listed on all exchanges, including Nasdaq. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg.
at 37,501–02.
3. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 53,829, 71 Fed. Reg. 30,038, 30,039 (May
24, 2006) (setting compliance dates for Regulation NMS). See also Regulation NMS, Exchange
Act Release No. 55,160, 72 Fed. Reg. 4202 (Jan. 30, 2007) (extending the Trading Phase Date
until March 5, 2007).
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Three” European exchanges—the London Stock Exchange (LSE), Deutsche
Börse AG, and Euronext N.V.4 More recently, of course, the U.S.
exchanges have entered the mix with their own proposals for cross-Atlantic
mergers.5 In addition to this merger activity among existing exchanges, the
scheduled implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive (MiFID) in November 2007 raises the potential that a transformed
regulatory environment may create a more meaningful opportunity for new
competitors to challenge the Big Three for market share in Europe. As a
result, the next few years will offer up a wealth of new data for evaluating
the effects of regulatory initiatives on competition in the equity markets.
The topic of the panel I spoke on at the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate,
Financial & Commercial Law symposium was entitled: The Respective
Roles of Government and Competition in Shaping and Developing the
Markets. The panel discussed the extent to which competition rather than
government regulation should shape the markets. I want to turn those
statements around and suggest that, in the absence of a regulatory scheme
specifically designed to promote competition among multiple equity
markets, there is unlikely to be significant competition because of the
economic forces that drive markets toward consolidation. Both economic
theory and historical experience suggest that a single equity market will
eventually dominate trading in its listed stocks. Regulations, therefore,
should be viewed as playing an essential role in preserving and promoting
equity market competition.
In examining this thesis, I will focus on three broad questions. First,
given the powerful network effect that operates in the equity markets—best
captured in the old maxim that liquidity attracts liquidity—is significant
competition among equity markets for trading volume in the same stocks
likely to exist in the absence of a regulatory scheme that makes such
competition a primary objective?
Second, assuming that regulation does indeed play an essential role in
promoting competition among equity markets, what regulatory tools are
most effective in promoting competition, without losing the economic good
that underlies the network effect (the best prices for investors)?
Finally, are regulatory efforts to promote competition among equity
markets actually worth it? I will examine whether the benefits of such
4. U.K. COMPETITION COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE PROPOSED ACQUISITION OF LONDON
STOCK EXCHANGE PLC BY DEUTSCHE BÖRSE AG OR EURONEXT NV, 3–4, 22–24, 44 (Nov. 2005)
[hereinafter U.K. COMPETITION REPORT].
5. As this article goes to press, it appears that the proposed merger of the NYSE and
Euronext will be completed, while Nasdaq’s tender offer for the LSE has not been accepted
by LSE shareholders. Press Release, NYSE Euronext to Commence Offer for Euronext Shares
(Feb. 15, 2007), available at http://www.nyse.com/press/1171453128510.html (announcing
commencement of offer for Euronext shares); Press Release, Nasdaq, Final Offers Lapsed
(Feb. 10, 2007), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/newsroomnewsHeadlines.
aspx?year= (follow “Final Offers Lapsed”) (announcing lapse of final offer for LSE shares).
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competition exceed the costs of fragmenting the buying and selling interest
in individual stocks, particularly by focusing on three historical events that
offer empirical evidence to help assess this question.
II. IS REGULATION ESSENTIAL FOR EQUITY MARKET
COMPETITION?
One of the primary statutory objectives for the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) is to ensure fair competition among exchange markets,
and between exchange markets and markets other than exchange markets.6
Competition in this context refers to competition among multiple markets to
attract trading volume in the same stocks. Markets compete in this way by
offering better trading services to investors, such as low access fees, reliable
systems, and innovative trading tools.7 This type of competition is distinct
from competition for listings, where the quality of trading services may be
but one of many factors that influence an issuer’s decision on where to list
initially and whether to switch listings. In contrast, the quality of a market’s
trading services is more likely to be vitally important to actual traders and
investors than it is to company management.
When evaluating the issue of equity market competition, the starting
point is the principle that “liquidity attracts liquidity”—known in economic
terms as a “network effect.”8 As a single market attracts more and more
trading volume in a stock, each new participant in that market enhances the
value of the market to both existing and prospective participants by adding
liquidity and thereby enabling that market to offer better prices. After an
initial period of potentially vigorous competition among multiple markets,
liquidity can be expected to tip to a single market and stick there
indefinitely. Because of this network effect, any market attempting to
compete with the dominant market faces a tough challenge. Even if the new
competitor offers better technology and lower fees, it may not attract
trading volume because it cannot assure its participants that they will
receive prices that match the quality of executions available on the
dominant market. Moreover, the dominant market may respond to
competitive challenges by reducing fees in the short-term until a competitor
is driven off, or by adopting an improved technology that was developed
and introduced by the competitor.
The consequences of the network effect can be seen today by assessing
the equity markets throughout the world. The network effect appears to be
alive and well. In countries other than the U.S., the major equity exchanges
6. Exchange Act § 11A(a)(1)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2000).
7. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Rescind Exchange Rule 390;
Commission Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577, 10,582 (Feb. 28, 2000).
8. See LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR
PRACTITIONERS 526, 535–36 (2003).
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overwhelmingly dominate public trading in their listed stocks. Examples
include the LSE in the United Kingdom; the Tokyo Stock Exchange in
Japan; Deutsche Börse in Germany; Euronext in France, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Portugal; and the Toronto Stock Exchange in Canada.
In contrast, the U.S. equity markets currently are characterized by
extremely vigorous competition among a variety of different types of
markets for trading volume in the same stocks. For example, the NYSE
floor, which historically has dominated trading in NYSE stocks, has seen its
market share diminish in recent months. To counter the trend, the NYSE
has adopted a Hybrid Market that offers fully automated access to its
displayed quotes. Of course, the NYSE also has merged with the fully
automated Archipelago Exchange, but the NYSE Group has decided to
maintain both entities as separate exchanges that simultaneously trade
NYSE stocks on different trading platforms.9 Therefore, to some extent the
two trading platforms operating under the NYSE Group umbrella will be
competing with each other for volume in NYSE stocks.
For its part, Nasdaq has been approved as an exchange, has merged
with two competitor ECNs, and has integrated the respective three trading
systems into a single system with superior technology than its old system.
Nasdaq has increased its share of trading in NYSE stocks by, among other
things, offering low-cost routing to the NYSE floor for orders that check the
Nasdaq order book first.10
The American Stock Exchange (Amex), like the NYSE, is transforming
a manual floor-based market into a hybrid market with primarily automated
trading.11 The four traditionally “regional” exchanges—Chicago, Boston,
Philadelphia, and National—have all received capital infusions from major
securities firms wary of a potential NYSE/Nasdaq duopoly that would
dominate trading in U.S. equities.12 The regionals have adopted new,
automated equity trading systems and believe that they have their best
opportunity in many years to compete effectively for trading volume with
the larger exchanges. Similarly, “[t]he two traditionally options
exchanges—CBOE [the Chicago Board Options Exchange] and ISE [the

9. NYSE Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4–5 (2005).
10. Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 22–26 (Nov. 8, 2006),
available at http://excite.brand.edgar-online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHTML1?
SessionID=dqUgjAWGR6-FQ1D&ID=4750663; Nasdaq Membership Frequently Asked
Questions (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/trader/er/er_faqs.pdf.
11. Press Release, AMEX, American Stock Exchange’s New Electronic Trading Platform
Compliant With Regulation NMS (March 5, 2007), available at http://www.amex.com/
?href=/atamex/news/press/sn_AEMIRegNMS_030507.htm.
12. Emily Lambert, Could Small Mean Big? Why Regional Exchanges Are Heating Up,
FORBES.COM, July 3, 2006, http://members.forbes.com/forbes/2006/0703/054b.html.
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International Securities Exchange]—have decided to expand into [trading]
equities and . . . [have adopted] new, automated equity trading systems.”13
Finally, in addition to the ten registered securities exchanges, a variety
of alternative trading systems (ATSs) compete for trading volume in U.S.
stocks. Three electronic communications networks (ECNs) publicly display
their quotes through the National Association of Securities Dealers’
(NASD’s) Alternative Display Facility, and a large number of other ATSs
operate “dark” pools of liquidity. These dark ATSs include crossing
systems that facilitate block trading by institutional investors, as well as
liquidity pools operated by broker-dealers that seek to match orders
internally prior to any interaction with the transparent, public markets.14
The United States and other countries have contrasting expectations for
a competitive equity market structure. While market participants in other
countries have long accepted dominant exchanges, many in the U.S. have
expressed great concern over the prospect of a duopoly with trading
dominated by the NYSE Group and Nasdaq. This concern to maintain a
competitive market structure reflects a fundamental policy choice of the
U.S. regulatory scheme.15 The Exchange Act directs the SEC to facilitate
the establishment of a national market system (NMS).16 The NMS is made
up of multiple markets that simultaneously trade the same stocks. One of
the primary NMS objectives is to ensure fair competition among brokerdealers, among exchange markets, and between exchange markets and nonexchange markets.17
This NMS approach to market structure is an attempt to have your cake
and eat it too. On the one hand, investors in the United States want to have
the benefits of competition among markets (such as innovative trading tools
and low trading fees). But on the other hand, they want to minimize any
adverse effects of “fragmentation”—when the buying and selling interest in
individual stocks becomes so split up among multiple markets that it
interferes with efficient pricing of those stocks.18 In this respect, the NMS
“incorporates two distinct types of competition—competition among

13. Annette L. Nazareth, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks Before the STA Annual Conference (Oct.
13, 2006). See also John Authers & Norma Cohen, Clearing the Floor: How a Regulatory
Overhaul Is Helping Rivals to Close in on the Big Board, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006 (noting that
ISE launched its equity trading service in the Fall of 2006, while CBOE planned to launch
in 2007).
14. Daniel Safarik, Illuminating the Dark, ADVANCED TRADING, Sept. 26, 2006, at 26, 28;
Nina Mehta, Who’s Afraid of the Dark?, TRADERS MAGAZINE, May 2006, at 36, 40–41.
15. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a–78nn (2000)).
16. Exchange Act § 11A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. 78k-1(a)(2) (2000).
17. Exchange Act § 11A(a)(1)(C)(ii).
18. Commission Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Exchange
Act Release No. 42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577, 10,577–78 (Feb. 28, 2000) (requesting comment on
issues relating to market fragmentation).
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individual markets and competition among [individual] orders.”19 The
Commission’s market structure challenge over the years has been to
maintain an appropriate balance between these two forms of competition.20
III. WHICH REGULATORY TOOLS PROMOTE COMPETITION
AND EFFICIENCY?
The SEC has balanced the two objectives of competition among
markets and competition among orders by utilizing familiar regulatory
tools. They include price transparency, non-discriminatory access to
markets, non-discriminatory access to clearing and settlement systems, and
the duty of best execution.
Mandatory price transparency helps non-dominant markets compete by
enabling them to provide some assurance that their prices are as good as
those offered by the dominant market. If the dominant market displays a
quote to anyone, it is required to display that quote to the public.21
Mandatory fair and non-discriminatory access to markets prevents a
dominant market from restricting its prices to favored customers.22 Open
access also prevents the dominant market from inhibiting traders from
participating in other markets, such as through off-board trading
restrictions.23
In addition, market participants in the United States have fair and nondiscriminatory access to a national clearing and settlement system, no
matter the particular market where a trade was executed. The extraordinary
importance of this regulatory tool is apparent from the state of exchange
competition in Europe, where individual markets own clearing and
settlement systems as part of “vertical silos” in which trading services are
effectively tied to clearance and settlement services.24 Notably, when
Congress ordered the creation of a national system for trading stocks in
1975, it also ordered the creation of a national system for clearing and
settling trades.25
Finally, the duty of best execution plays a vital role in promoting
competition by creating incentives for brokers to search for the best
19. See William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Testimony Concerning Recent Developments
in the Equity Markets Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
(May 19, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts051905whd.htm.
20. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,498–99 (June 29,
2005) (adopting release).
21. See Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. Reg.
48,290 (Sept. 12, 1996).
22. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,540.
23. Off-board trading restrictions prevent an exchange’s members “from effecting transactions
in [the exchange’s] listed securities away from a national securities exchange.” Commission
Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Exchange Act Release No.
42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577 (Feb. 28, 2000) (proposing rescission of NYSE Rule 390).
24. U.K. COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 4, at 59, 67–70.
25. Exchange Act § 17A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(a) (Supp. II 2002).
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available markets.26 In some cases, brokers may be committed to a
dominant market because of financial considerations or other self-interests,
or just through plain inertia. The duty of best execution helps focus brokers
on the interests of their customers in trading on the best market. This focus
expands the opportunity for smaller markets to compete with a dominant
market by offering better prices or trading services that brokers are legally
required to consider.
Many of these regulatory tools that promote competition also can
minimize the adverse effects of fragmentation. For example, price
transparency and open access help keep prices in line among all the
different markets that trade a particular stock. If quoted prices diverge, the
differences can immediately be arbitraged away. Public disclosure of order
execution quality statistics by all markets is another important aspect of
price transparency.27 This specialized disclosure supplements real-time
quote and trade transparency by honing in on the quality of executions
actually provided at different markets for different types of orders that
otherwise could not be seen by the public. Comparable statistics on order
execution quality both help equalize the prices available across markets and
enable markets to compete more directly on the quality of their order
executions by making this factor visible to brokers and customers.28
IV. DO THE BENEFITS OF COMPETING EQUITY MARKETS
OUTWEIGH THE COSTS OF REGULATION AND
FRAGMENTATION?
Multiple markets trading the same stocks are necessary to have a
competitive market structure. But the severity of any adverse effects of
fragmentation may increase as the number of competing markets increases.
The regulatory tools mentioned in Part III can help direct order flow to
markets that offer the best prices. These tools thereby minimize the most
obvious risk of fragmentation, which is that an investor’s order will be
executed at an inferior price in one market, while the best price was readily
available in another market.

26. Order Execution Obligations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 48,322 (“A broker-dealer’s duty of best
execution derives from common law agency principles and fiduciary obligations, and is
incorporated both in SRO rules and, through judicial decisions, in the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws.”).
27. Regulation NMS Rule 605, 17 C.F.R. § 242.605 (2006).
28. See generally Ekkehart Boehmer, Robert Jennings & Li Wei, Public Disclosure and
Private Decisions: Equity Market Execution Quality and Order Routing, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 315
(2007) (examining whether public disclosure affects behavior and finding that it produces
beneficial effects); Xin Zhao & Kee H. Chung, Information Disclosure and Market Quality: The
Effect of SEC Rule 11Ac1-5 on Trading Costs, 42 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=440429 (analyzing the impact of public disclosure and
concluding that it encourages competition among market centers and reduces trading costs).
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A deeper issue in evaluating a fragmented market structure, however, is
whether its “best” prices are any good—particularly, whether the prices
produced by a fragmented market structure are as good as the prices that
would be produced by a more consolidated market structure. In other
words, do the benefits of regulatory efforts to promote competition among
multiple markets outweigh the excessive transaction costs that might be
imposed on investors if fragmentation impaired price discovery for
individual stocks?
As an initial matter, one should not fail to recognize, or underestimate,
the costs of a fragmented market structure merely because investor
transaction costs can be difficult to calculate precisely. Institutional investtors experience this difficulty acutely because they trade in large size.
Institutional investors, such as mutual funds and retirement plans, represent
the financial interests of millions of individuals by enabling them to invest
indirectly in the equity markets. For institutional investors alone, the implicit transaction costs associated with the prices at which their orders are
executed has been estimated to be as high as 1% of the principal amount of
their transactions.29 Dollar cost estimates range from a conservative $30
billion to more than $100 billion annually. To provide a frame of reference,
the total non-listing revenues of the NYSE Group and Nasdaq in 2005 were
approximately $2.11 billion.30 Consequently, the potential benefits of competition among markets in minimizing exchange fees are smaller by an
order of magnitude than the potential costs to investors of impaired price
discovery.
This issue of the trade-off between competition and fragmentation can
be endlessly debated in theory, depending on one’s views about optimal
market structure. It is therefore interesting to look for relevant empirical
data that might shed light on the issue. I will consider three historical
periods that offer relevant natural experiments on the benefits and costs of
competition among equity markets: first, in 1996, the entry of ECNs into
the market for Nasdaq stocks following the Commission’s adoption of the
Order Handling Rules; second, in 2004, the LSE’s initiation of the Dutch
Trading Service (DTS) to compete with Euronext for trading in Dutch
stocks; and third, also in 2004, the competition between the NYSE and
Nasdaq to provide the most efficient market structure for trading their
respective listed stocks.
Prior to the Order Handling Rules, trading in Nasdaq stocks was divided primarily between two markets: (1) the public dealer market operated
29. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,533, 37,608 n.990
(June 29, 2005) (adopting release); Request for Comments on Measures to Improve Disclosure of
Mutual Fund Transaction Costs, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,313, 68 Fed. Reg.
74,820, 74,822 (Dec. 24, 2003).
30. NYSE Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 67, 69 (2006); Nasdaq Stock Market,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 42 (2006).
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by Nasdaq, and (2) the private agency market operated by a single ECN—
Instinet. The public quotes for Nasdaq stocks generally reflected only
market maker quotations. Instinet, in contrast, generally had better prices
than the market maker quotes, but made these prices available only to
Instinet subscribers and not to the public.
A natural experiment on the effect of increased equity market
competition occurred when the SEC adopted rules to improve price
transparency. The SEC required market makers to include in their quotes
(or send to ECNs) customer limit orders that improved the market makers’
published quotes. Market makers also were required to publicly display
their best prices, either in their own quotes or through an ECN. The SEC
believed the new rules would, among other things, address industry
practices that had hindered competition among markets in Nasdaq stocks.31
The Order Handling Rules led to the creation of many new ECNs,
which in turn transformed the market structure for Nasdaq stocks. The
percentage of ECN trading in Nasdaq stocks rose from 9% in 1996 to 40%
in 2003.32 The entry of these new competitors improved both the quality of
trading services and the quality of prices for Nasdaq stocks. For example,
market access fees fell dramatically—by approximately 80%.33 In addition,
many economic studies found that investor transaction costs had declined
significantly, with quoted and effective spreads declining by approximately
30%.34 Importantly, a more competitive market structure also led to
increased liquidity that benefited institutional investors in executing their
large trades.35 Thus, the Order Handling Rules provide a good example of a
regulatory change that was a “win-win” for market structure—they led to
both a significant increase in competition among markets and a significant
reduction in transaction costs for investors.
When assessing the impact of the Order Handling Rules on market
quality, one must recognize not only that there was an increased number of
competing markets, but also that these competing markets were efficiently
linked together through participation in a centralized, Nasdaq-operated
trading system. The ECN quotes therefore were fully accessible to all
participants in the dominant Nasdaq market, which allowed the ECNs to
attract order flow both directly from subscribers and indirectly through
31. Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,290,
48,292 (Sept. 12, 1996).
32. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SECURITIES MARKETS: DECIMAL PRICING HAS
CONTRIBUTED TO LOWER TRADING COSTS AND A MORE CHALLENGING TRADING ENVIRONMENT
40 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05535.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report].
33. Letter from Edward J. Nicoll, CEO, Instinet Group Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 5
(June 30, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71004/igi063004.pdf
(commenting on proposed Regulation NMS).
34. Commission Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Exchange
Act Release No. 42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577, 10,584 (Feb. 28, 2000).
35. Id. at 10,585 n.53, 10,581–82.
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Nasdaq.36 As a result, competition increased, but within the context of an
efficient linkage that helped minimize fragmentation.
The initiation of DTS by the LSE in 2004 provides a second natural
experiment on the effect of increased equity market competition. The LSE
decided to compete for trading volume in Dutch stocks in response to a
request from Dutch trading firms for a new entrant to compete with the
dominant Euronext exchange.37 The Dutch firms were dissatisfied with
Euronext for a variety of reasons, including high fees and unreliable trading
systems.38 Despite this seemingly promising opportunity for a new competitor, DTS was able to divert only a very low percentage of trading volume
from Euronext.39 One important factor that enabled Euronext to maintain its
market share was its decision to lower trading fees by as much as 50% in
response to the new competitor. This example of what a little competition
can do for exchange fees is unlikely to have passed unnoticed in the U.S.
when market participants considered the prospect of an NYSE-Nasdaq
duopoly.
An economic study of the DTS experience made some interesting
findings.40 First, the study found that market quality appeared to improve
significantly, despite the limited competitive success of DTS. While spreads
stayed about the same, the consolidated displayed depth for the multiplytraded Dutch stocks increased by nearly 100% after the commencement of
quoting on both DTS and Euronext.41 Second, the study found that the
ability of DTS to compete was hampered by an apparent failure of trading
firms to use effective smart routers linked to DTS. For example, Euronext
frequently traded through better-priced quotes on DTS. The study
concluded that both the ability of DTS to compete, and the beneficial effect
on market quality, would have been greater if more trading firms had used
smart routers to access better-priced DTS quotes.42 A stronger duty of best
execution might have been helpful as a means to encourage brokers to route
their orders to better prices that were immediately and automatically
accessible on DTS, rather than executing their customers’ orders at an
inferior price on the dominant exchange.

36. James McAndrews & Chris Stefanadis, The Emergence of Electronic Communications
Networks in the U.S. Equity Markets, 6 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. AND FIN., Oct. 2000, at 2.
37. U.K. COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 4, at 49–50.
38. COMPETITION COMM’N, PROPOSED ACQUISITION OF LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE PLC BY
DEUTSCHE BÖRSE AG OR EURONEXT NV, PROVISIONAL FINDINGS REPORT 76 (Aug. 3, 2005),
http://www.mmc.gov.uk/inquiries/ref2005/lse/prov_find_report.pdf.
39. Id. at 50.
40. See Thierry Foucault & Albert J. Menkveld, Competition for Order Flow and Smart Order
Routing Systems, (European Business Schools Librarians’ Group, Working Paper No. 831, 2006),
available at http://www.hec.fr/hec/fr/professeurs_recherche/upload/cahiers/CR831Foucault.pdf.
41. Id. at 28.
42. Id. at 32.
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A third natural experiment on the costs and benefits of competition
among markets is provided by comparing the market structures for NYSE
stocks and Nasdaq stocks in early 2004. The two market structures provide
an interesting natural experiment because of their contrasting levels of
competition and consolidation. At that time, the NYSE floor retained
approximately a 75% share of trading in its listed stocks, while still operating a manual trading mechanism that did not offer full automated access
to displayed quotations.43 In contrast, the market for Nasdaq stocks was
automated, but seriously fragmented with trading volume split among many
different markets, including Nasdaq, Inet, Arca, other ECNs, and market
makers.44 As a result, the respective market structures for NYSE and
Nasdaq stocks in 2004 allow one to compare the market quality of, first, a
centralized, manual market with little effective competition, and, second, a
highly fragmented, automated market with vigorous competition.
As part of the Commission’s review of market structure issues for
Regulation NMS, the Commission staff examined comparative market
quality for NYSE and Nasdaq stocks during the first part of 2004.
Commentators opposed to the Regulation NMS proposals had asserted that
trading in Nasdaq stocks was more efficient than trading in NYSE stocks,
and that therefore there was no empirical basis for the Commission to adopt
a trade-through rule for Nasdaq stocks.45 To assess these comments,
Commission staff analyzed a variety of indicators of market quality,
including: short-term volatility; quoted, effective, and realized spreads; fill
rates for marketable limit orders; and displayed depth.46 The Commission
found that the staff studies did not support the commentators’ claim that
trading in Nasdaq stocks was more efficient than trading in NYSE stocks.
Rather, it concluded that both markets had weaknesses that could be
addressed by updated and strengthened protection against trade-throughs.47
Subsequently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), as part of its
report on the effect of decimal trading, studied trading in NYSE and Nasdaq
stocks and made findings that are consistent with the Commission staff’s
studies.48
The staff and GAO studies offer useful data for evaluating the potential
costs of fragmentation. The staff studies found, for example, that short-term
volatility was significantly higher for Nasdaq stocks than for comparable
NYSE stocks, particularly for stocks that fall outside the top tier of trading

43. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 49,325, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,126, 11,128 (Mar. 9,
2004) (proposing release); Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg.
37,517–18 (June 29, 2005) (adopting release).
44. Regulation NMS, 69 Fed. Reg. at 11,128 (proposing release).
45. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,506 (adopting release).
46. Id. at 37,515, 37,600.
47. Id. at 37,512.
48. See GAO Report, supra note 32.
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volume.49 Consistent with this finding, the GAO study found that displayed
depth for Nasdaq stocks was approximately one-half of the displayed depth
for comparable NYSE stocks.50 In addition, the GAO study found that,
while spreads were comparable for the top tier of actively traded stocks,
spreads in stocks with less trading volume generally were wider for Nasdaq
stocks than NYSE stocks.51 Finally, the GAO examined the transaction cost
data for institutional investors generated by three private vendors of
transaction cost analyses. Consistent with GAO’s findings on displayed
depth and spreads, the vendor data showed that institutional transaction
costs were higher for Nasdaq stocks than NYSE stocks.52
These three experiments suggest varying conclusions on the benefits of
market competition and the costs of market fragmentation. The Order
Handling Rules and DTS examples suggest that a market structure with an
overwhelmingly dominant market can be improved by the entry of new
competitors. The DTS example particularly suggests that MiFID could
prompt substantial improvements in the European equity markets if, as
intended, it successfully enables new markets to challenge the dominant
markets for trading share in their listed stocks. But the NYSE-Nasdaq
example suggests caution. A highly fragmented market with superior
technology may not, in fact, produce better prices for investors than a
manual market with significantly consolidated order flow, particularly for
investors in the thousands of smaller companies with stocks that fall outside
the top tier of active trading. The severity of the adverse effects of
fragmentation may well increase as trading volume decreases.
V. CONCLUSION
In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission concluded that the
market structure for both Nasdaq and NYSE stocks would be improved—
though in different ways that reflect their current structural differences—by
an updated and strengthened trade-through rule that protects only those
displayed quotations that are immediately and automatically accessible.53
The SEC noted that the new rule would promote competition by new or
smaller markets with larger markets by assuring the markets that, if they
display the best prices, they will attract order flow and cannot simply be
ignored by participants in dominant markets.54 The Commission also
expected that the new rule would help promote greater depth and liquidity
and reduce investor transaction costs.55
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,515.
See GAO Report, supra note 32, at 33 fig.8.
See id. at 11–12 tbls.1&2.
See id. at 98–99 figs.17 & 18.
See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,506.
Id. at 37,607.
See id. at 37,511–12, 37,537, 37,606–07.
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Events since the adoption of Regulation NMS indicate that the prospect
of strengthened trade-through protection has boosted the competitive
opportunities of smaller markets. The effects of the new rule on market
quality and investor transaction costs, however, remain to be seen. These
effects will play out over the coming months as the new trade-through rule
is fully implemented. It will be quite interesting to see the new data,
generated by another natural experiment, on the effects of regulatory
change on equity market competition and fragmentation.

